Mannerheim, Molotov, Mainila: The Winter War
To the East lay a wolf.
Plagued from 1919 to 1933 by economic depression and political turmoil, Germany left the First World War defeated, demoralized, and poor. In a country where a wheelbarrow of money could buy a loaf of bread, people desperately wanted a change of leadership. Germany’s answer was an Austrian artist and war hero, proved in the Munich beer halls of right-wing thought. Fiery demagogue and skilled manipulator, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler came to power democratically by 1933, vowing to save Germany from its economic and political woes. Once handed power, Hitler instantly began to demonstrate his hunger for living-space, or Lebensraum. The terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which Germany was forced to sign after the end of the First World War, forbade Germany to possess a military or develop new technology. Disregarding the treaty, Hitler expanded his army and ramped up military production. After growing his well-trained forces, Hitler set his sights on Western Europe, militarizing the Rhineland border region between Germany and France by March of 1936. In 1938, unreprimanded by the Allied powers, Hitler continued his spree: he annexed Austria in March and seized the northern Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia in September.
Looking across the wheatfields of Poland and Ukraine sat Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. A native of Georgia, Stalin came to power through violence and backstabbing, slowly climbing to the top of the Bolshevik party’s blood-greased ladder. Unlike Hitler, Stalin was not elected democratically—he was bequeathed a title that he fought for. After the end of a long, costly Civil War, Stalin officially seized the reins of power in April of 1922.
Stalin respected Hitler as a vulnerable swimmer respects a shark. Constantly monitoring Hitler’s every move, Stalin made sure to keep his distance, lest he should be swallowed up by the ferocious jaws of the Reich. Though they possessed certain similarities, such as their manipulation and hunger for territory, both men were ideological opposites. Stalin passionately condemned fascism. Hitler came to power after persecuting and opposing German communists. During the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, the Nazis supported Fascist dictator Francisco Franco, whereas the Soviet Union sent aid to Franco’s enemies. Given their ideological opposition, Stalin knew that a conflict between the Soviet Union and the Nazis was unavoidable. Cognizant of Hitler’s power, Stalin chose to anticipate and react to Hitler’s moves, instead of trying to act out against him. Stalin wanted to give himself time to prepare his army and erect the necessary defenses, man-made and natural.
Stalin believed that if the Nazis were to invade the Soviet Union, they would likely attack Leningrad, a key economic and political center. A Petrine creation and Russia’s “window to the West,” Leningrad was a symbolic capital of communism, housing the Soviet Baltic Fleet and numerous arms factories. Unlike Moscow, Leningrad was a western city, only hundreds of miles from the Nazis. Seeking a buffer zone between Leningrad and the Nazis, Stalin looked to Finland.
Although Finland and the Soviet Union shared an 800 mile-long border, each nation could not have been any more unlike the other. Finland was a relatively peaceful, neutral nation, whereas the Soviet Union endured disastrous experiences in the First World War and 1917 revolution. The Soviet Union’s 170.6 million citizens dwarfed Finland’s 3.7 million. Unable to rival the Soviet Union’s military might, Stalin was convinced that Finland would easily capitulate to a Soviet invasion. Because of Hitler’s demonstrated militarism and ideological differences, Stalin turned to Finland, a weak and poorly-defended country, to annex a buffer zone between Leningrad and the Nazis.
Reacting to the Nazi annexation of Austria in March of 1938, Stalin sent Boris Yartsev, the Second Secretary of the Soviet legation in Finland, to negotiate with the Finns about a defensive alliance. As historian Albin T. Anderson writes, Yartsev’s rationale was simple: “It was assumed that Hitler had in mind an eventual multi-pronged attack upon the Soviet Union. One of these attacking wings would undoubtedly seek to pass through Finland. Such an eventuality would force the USSR to anticipate the Germans in Finland and that country would then become an area of hostility. Yartsev's government felt it prudent, therefore, that the two countries begin discussions relating to mutual defense.” Yartsev offered the Finns military aid and guaranteed the integrity of Finnish borders. In return, he asked that the Soviets militarize the key Finnish island of Suursari, which would help protect Leningrad from Nazi naval invasion. Finland, though, did not blindly agree to Soviet demands: they feared that a militarized Suursari could serve as a pretext for a Soviet land invasion, a violation of their neutrality and sovereignty. Cornered between ceding valuable land to Stalin or risking a bloody, drawn-out conflict with the Soviet Union, the Finns prevaricated, as Anderson notes: “The only concession which the Finns would grant at this time was to promise that conversations would be resumed in Moscow on the occasion of the dedication of the new Finnish legation early in December.”
By the fall of 1938, as the Soviet Union eagerly eyed Finland and the Baltic States, Helsinki kept its cards close to its vest. Instead of trying to reason with the Soviets, the Finns stalled for as long as possible. Stalin, meanwhile, knew that the window to prepare his nation for a Nazi invasion was quickly diminishing. Seeing through the Finnish delay, Stalin ordered Boris Stein, a top Soviet diplomat stationed in Rome, to expedite negotiations in Helsinki. By mid-march of 1939, the two nations reached an impasse: the Finnish delegation, led by Prime Minister Aimo Cajander, averred that such “an exchange of the proposed territory would be politically hazardous and impossible to justify to the Finnish people.”
As Soviet diplomats waged mental war with the Finns, Stalin sent his best statesman, Vyacheslav Molotov, to negotiate with the Nazis by April of 1939. After months of diplomatic speculation and negotiations, two burgeoning powers came to an unlikely agreement.
August 23, 1939, sealed the fate of Europe. In a state meeting room in Moscow, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Soviet diplomat Vyacheslav Molotov put pen to paper, ensuring the creation of a Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. The treaty stunned the world, but it especially came as a shock to the Finns, who “discovered how difficult it was for a small power to retain freedom of action in the face of big-power maneuvering.” In October, Stalin, aware that the Finnish position was weakened, sent more diplomats to Helsinki. On October 12, the Soviets lay all their cards on the table, proposing “that Finland relinquish a group of major islands in the Gulf, including Suursaari and Koivisto; that the USSR be leased a naval and airbase on the Finnish coast, preferably Hanko; that the Karelian border be moved west…, that the Russians be granted a bit of territory on Petsamo in the far north; and, finally, that the Finns agree to a limited pact of mutual assistance designed to guarantee the security of the Finnish Gulf.” Although the Finns had their backs to the wall, they did not budge. By the fall of 1939, the nations became locked in diplomatic stalemate. Conflict, it seemed, was imminent.
In Mainila, Soviet Union, a small border town, the peace and quiet of the dew-kissed morning of November 26th did not last for long. Tired of unproductive negotiation and impatient to seize borderlands, Stalin had his men shell the village and blame it on the Finns. Although the Soviets insisted that the Finns were responsible for the carnage, Helsinki denied all responsibility, declaring war four days later. Thus, the stage was set: one of history’s largest powers would invade a young, largely neutral nation, lake-laden and wintry, protected by a small army and bands of ex-hunters. The Soviet tanks lumbered across the Finnish border on the night of November 30, 1939.
Given the Soviet Union’s military might, it was expected that victory would come quickly. This, however, was not the case: the first few weeks of the conflict were disastrous for the Soviet infantry. Much like the elusive Viet Cong of the 1960s and 70s, the Finns masterfully waged guerilla warfare against a much larger, mechanized army. Taking advantage of their speed and tactics, the Finns drew Soviet forces away from bases of operation, encircling them and attacking from all sides. Unlike the Soviets, the Finns knew the snowy terrain inside and out. Lurking in the trees and hiding in plain sight, the Finns inflicted heavy casualties during the beginning weeks of the war.
To exemplify the dogged determination and brilliant strategy with which the Finns fought, it is necessary to look to Simo Hayha. A gifted sniper, Hayha was a master of disguise and braved the elements to fight for his country. Hayha knew the snow-covered Finnish countryside like the back of his hand, always using his knowledge to gain an advantage. Aware of Finland’s icy temperatures, Hayha preferred an iron sight on his rifle over a scope, since a scope would give off a distinctive glint in the sun and fog up in the cold. Dressed entirely in layers of white, Hayha blended into the snow and was conscientious of every detail: he put snow in his mouth while aiming so that when he exhaled he would not give off steam and reveal his location. Despite the conditions and iron sight, Hayha’s exploits made him the world’s most successful sniper: he earned over 500 kills during the 100-day Winter War, averaging at least five confirmed kills a day. Whereas Hayha and the Finns blended into their wintry surroundings, the Soviet infantry stood out against their Baltic backdrop, making them easy targets. In a classic backfire of totalitarianism, Stalin had purged all of his leading military strategists the decade prior, leaving the Soviet army highly disorganized and unprepared for their new environment. After his service, Hayha became a national hero, hailed as “the White Death.”
It is those soldiers, like Hayha, who fended off the Soviets for months at the Battle of Kollaa in December 1939. According to Finnish estimates, “the Soviet Union had roughly 16,000 men, while the Finnish Infantry Regiment 34 initially had about 3,000 men. The Finns fought an estimated fivefold superiority.” Outnumbered and outgunned, the Finns held the line until the end of the war months later, defeating the Russians. The Finnish stand at Kollaa gave the army new resolve in their fight against the Soviets: the quote “Kollaa will hold” galvanized the Finns and spread like wildfire across the frontlines. Even today, it is a symbol of Finnish perseverance in the face of hardship.
Despite Soviet advantages in men, tanks, and artillery, the Finns kept resisting, inventing new ways to adapt to their enemies. On New Year’s Day 1940, the Finns scored a massive victory against Soviet armor at the Battle of Raate Road, equipped with Molotov cocktails, a new weapon sardonically named after the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs whose scheming placed the Finns in between the rock of communism and the hard place of fascism. Surprisingly effective, Finnish soldiers made Molotov cocktails from half-empty alcohol bottles, stuffing rags through the bottleneck and lighting them on fire. Camouflaged and courageous, the Finns staved off the communist hordes for months.
Astounded and furious, Stalin ordered a personnel change on January 7th, 1940: he replaced General Kliment Voroshilov with General Semyon Timoshenko. Unusually tall, Ukrainian, and spotlessly bald, Timoshenko was a stickler for tradition. A martinet who advocated for a return to tsarist discipline, Timoshenko understood the importance of Soviet tanks and training. Refocusing on the Soviet assault on the key Karelian Isthmus, Timoshenko was able to eventually break the Finnish resistance and forced the Finns to sue for peace by March 13th. Although the Soviets did end up claiming key regions in the Southern region of Karelia, all the spoils of war were pyrrhic: the short, 105-day conflict cost the Red Army hundreds of thousands of men. Despite losing the Winter War, the Finns gallantly repelled a world superpower through cunning tactics and staunch nationalism. Each Finn fought to the very last against the Soviet invasion.
Soviet General Semyon Timoshenko.
Although the Soviets lost precious time and equipment fighting in the Winter War, their failure served as an invaluable wake-up call that would later help them repel the Nazi invasion. Guided by Timoshenko’s reforms and planning, the Soviets used the Winter War as a litmus test to see where their weaknesses lay. Timoshenko, an avid proponent of tank warfare, helped maximize Soviet efficiency on the battlefield: it is no coincidence that the Soviets would go on to defeat the Nazis during the Battle of Kursk—history’s largest tank battle—in August 1943. Timoshenko’s reforms transformed the Red Army from competent to formidable—it is widely accepted that Soviet tank production more than tripled from the Winter War’s end in 1940 to the end of the war in 1945. Entire factories and towns, such as Tankograd (literally: “tank town”), were devoted towards the production of armored vehicles.
Aside from military considerations, Stalin also gained experience off the battlefield. Devoted and determined to fight to the last man, the Finns had nearly repelled the Soviet invasion through unbreakable nationalism. The Soviets, however, struggled to find loyalty and love for their new nation, whose creation in a bloody revolution had killed many of their fathers and brothers. Aware of the unwavering German devotion for Hitler, Stalin worked to broaden the influence of his cult of personality, planting seeds of nationalism in all aspects of Soviet life.
Seeking to defend his nation from a Nazi invasion, Stalin invaded Finland. Despite Soviet military superiority, the Finns, through their unflagging nationalism and shrewd tactics, were able to inflict heavy losses upon the Soviets, making all seized territory won at too great a cost to be justifiable.
Bibliography
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2008988
Dunn, Walter S. Stalin's Keys to Victory: The Rebirth of the Red Army in World War II. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007.
https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/jokainen-suomalainen-mies-haluaisi-olla-marokon-kauhu-legendaarinen-sotilas-voitti-marokkolaiset-ja-venalaiset-tuomittiin-suomalaisen-murhayrityksesta-ja-kamppaili-loppuelamansa-alkoholin-kanssa/7043106#gs.jr6kz8
Trotter, William R. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. London: Aurum, 2003.
