Ukraine, Unipolarity, Upheaval: The State of Democracy and the Liberal World Order
February 24th, 2022. After weeks of deployment, months of posturing, and untold years of scheming, Vladimir Putin, from his gilded Kremlin desk, ordered “a special military operation” to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine. What Putin thought would be a two-week cakewalk that would enshrine him in Russian hagiography turned out to be a months-long disaster that has killed thousands of his soldiers and innocent civilians alike.
Vladimir Putin on February 24th, announcing the invasion of Ukraine.
Despite Putin’s ostensible military shortcomings, his invasion has done much to weaken the current world order, which are the broad parameters, agreements, checks and balances, and alliance systems governing statecraft and international relations. The current liberal world order is based around the allied powers of World War Two—save for Russia—and some newcomers, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Built upon pillars of free market capitalism, democracy, and multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations or the World Bank, the current world order has managed to bring relative peace to the world in the wake of the Second World War and has strived to secure greater human rights and freedoms for humanity. The world order has responded predictably to Putin’s aggression, imposing sanctions and rallying together to preserve the ideals of democracy in the face of mounting authoritarian aggression. Although Putin’s botched invasion of Ukraine has undeniably strengthened the ideological and military alliances between global liberal democracies, the current world order is at risk of failing because of its nonassertive international institutions and failure to incorporate the third world under its wing.
To understand the nature of the changing world order, it is necessary to understand how world orders are sustained, revised, and destroyed. According to political theorist Richard Haass, world orders tend to come “after a great convulsion that creates both the conditions and the desire for something new. It requires a stable distribution of power and broad acceptance of the rules that govern the conduct of international relations. It also needs skillful statecraft, since an order is made, not born. And no matter how ripe the starting conditions or strong the initial desire, maintaining it demands creative diplomacy, functioning institutions, and effective action to adjust it when circumstances change and buttress it when challenges come.” The Ukraine crisis may present the conditions for something new, as Putin’s aggression has placed Russia’s foot in the long-closed door of the once-stable international order.
Chiefly among the current world order’s woes is its failing, acquiescent international institutions. The seeming backbone of the order, the United Nations, was erected to help multilaterally enforce laws that all states could abide by. But the vital glue holding the current world order together is abiding by the rules, which burgeoning authoritarian powers around the world have stopped doing. As Haass notes regarding the “concert of Europe” world order from 1815-1914: “The concert worked not because there was complete agreement among the great powers on every point but because each state had its own reasons for supporting the overall system.” Not only is the United Nations ineffective at managing crises—their failure at enforcing international regulations during the Bosnian War and Rwandan Genocide serve as examples of their ineptitude when it comes to military force. Russia has benefitted from weak international punishments before, such as during its 2008 invasion of the Georgian region of South Ossetia or its 2014 annexation of Crimea. Each time, their aggression was “condemned” by the international community, a diplomatic slap on the wrist far short of an appropriate response. Receiving little to no severe punishment, Russia feels no reason to return to its uneasy peace with the world order.
The lead up to the Second World War can help serve as a useful example of what happens when a nation goes rogue. Following large-scale modernization and mechanization, the Empire of Japan disregarded the rules of the post-war League of Nations and invaded Manchuria, Northern China, in 1931. Like the crisis in Ukraine, Japan’s imperialist designs in Manchuria were not stymied by the existing liberalist system. Furthermore, the League of Nations’ inaction set a precedent for other aggressive states to follow: Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1936, and Nazi Germany bolstered its army and annexed Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia by 1938. Instead of being met by resistance and a unified allied bloc, defiant in the face of military buildup and treaty violations, they were appeased.
The current world order’s inaction could set a similarly dangerous precedent for other aggressive nations, such as Iran, North Korea, Iraq, or China. If gross breaches of human rights laws, a plethora of evidence of war crimes, and a full-scale violation of national sovereignty can not seem to get a military response from the international community, states seeking to bolster their power and challenge the unipolar world system will have immense leeway. As New Jersey representative Tom Malinowski remarked, “China’s watching this [war in Ukraine]. China has designs on Taiwan, we all know, and potentially other countries in its region. Iran is watching this. We do not want to send a signal to these aggressive powers that anything goes now—that the United States is no longer a serious country, that we’re no longer the head of a serious alliance that is willing to do its part to deter that kind of aggression.” The success of the current order has long been predicated on the world accepting American primacy. Now that it seems to be in question, the United States must force the world to accept it, lest it lose its power in a new multipolar world system with India and China sharing the stage.
The unwillingness of the third world to aid in Ukraine demonstrates another key shortcoming of the current world order: that it has failed to get small nations to buy into the system. The current world order emerged from the ashes of the Second World War, leaving states newly freed from colonialism with the issue of integrating themselves into the existing order. But their integration has not been easy—and, 75 years since V-E Day—it is evidently not complete. A recent vote to expel Russia from the UN Human Rights Council yielded damning results. Due to popular anti-western sentiment, increasing Russian aid and foreign investment, and a feeling that democracy has not worked in Africa, the vote ended with a surprising 24 votes against Russian removal and 58 votes of abstention.
With high-profile, supposed allies of the United States, such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa not voting to remove Russia, the evidence of Russia’s expanding sphere of influence is clear. In Mali, Russian influence has driven waves of pro-Russian protests, and, in the Central African Republic, Russia’s infamous Wagner Group mercenaries have savagely fought to ensure that strongman Faustin-Archange Touadéra will remain in power. The current world order is failing to save the capitalist democracies it was founded on, instead leaving them to backslide into parasitic authoritarianism. After all, over a quarter of Africans prefer authoritarianism to democracy, and that number could well increase before the war in Ukraine is over. The Russian blockade of the Black Sea stopped Ukraine’s vital grain exports from feeding much of the Middle East and Africa. A lack of food, Putin knows, can create the political disaffection required to instate authoritarians. Thriving off of the turmoil as though it were afflicted with Munchausen by Proxy, Russia can both create problems in Africa and then solve them by further installing strongmen.
Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine has strengthened the bonds between Western liberal democracies—Finland and Sweden plan to join NATO with all haste, Erdogan’s recalcitrance notwithstanding—it has highlighted the cracks in a crumbling system. Having failed to enforce its own rules, the current liberal world order must learn to redefine and strengthen itself in a time of rampant authoritarianism and aggression. If the world order is to be restored, it must get nations to wholeheartedly buy into its system all while advocating for the safety and prosperity of all allies of the order, regardless of size or apparent “importance”. The world order does not risk crumbling overnight, but it does risk expiring in “a prolonged deterioration rather than a sudden collapse.” Only through deliberate statecraft and reform can Moscow’s advances be frozen.
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